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Before the financial crisis, ECB officials tended to be
critical of the lack of fiscal policy discipline in numer-
ous EMU member countries but dismissed concerns
about external current account imbalances within the
currency union. Why should we be concerned about
current account imbalances in EMU when nobody
cares about current account imbalances among feder-
al states in the United States, they asked. With hind-
sight, it is clear that the comparison with the United
States was wrong and the complacency misplaced.
The euro area lacks the degree of political, economic
and financial integration that renders current account
imbalances among its member countries benign. 
In the Unites States, larger companies and banks
operate nation-wide – much more strongly compared
to the case within EMU. In addition, the US federal
government softens economic disparities through
transfers (notably through the social security system),
while such transfer possibilities are strongly limited in
Europe. In the rare cases when regional imbalances
threaten economic and financial stability a central
authority is available to manage the crisis. Thus, when
imprudent lending by local savings banks in the state
of Texas caused a financial crisis in the early 1980s,
the US federal government stepped in and re-struc-
tured the sector. Against this, there are hardly any
built-in mechanisms in EMU to correct unsustainable
current account imbalances, and a permanent crisis
mechanisms is presently still under construction. 
When excessive private and public borrowing from
abroad lead to an unsustainable current account
deficit, an EMU country is at risk of being suddenly
cut off from funding this deficit. A similar funding
risk was discovered during the 1980s and 1990s in
emerging market economies that had borrowed in
foreign currency; a cut-off from the international
capital markets was then dubbed in the economic lit-
erature a ‘sudden stop’. There is, however, an impor-
tant difference between the ‘sudden stop’ of capital
inflows experienced by emerging market economies
in the past and the ‘sudden stop’ experienced by some
EMU member countries today. In the former coun-
tries, the ‘sudden stop’ usually led to currency depre-
ciation and, in some cases, to default on the foreign
currency liabilities. In the latter, currency devaluation
is impossible, but the system of euro-area central
banks, the Eurosystem, has been pulled in to provide
bridge financing. As a result, sizeable financial imbal-
ances have developed within the Eurosystem. To
return to market-based funding structures in EMU
these imbalances will have to be unwound in the
years ahead. This will require painful private and
public sector de-leveraging over several years in a
number of countries.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows:
the first section describes the emergence of current
account imbalances within the euro area during the
period of easy private sector credit. The second section
illustrates how the Eurosystem has helped to fund
public sector deficits, followed by the third section
which shows how the Eurosystem has replaced private
capital flows to fund current account imbalances. The
final section contains our concluding remarks.
The rise of current account imbalances within EMU
Since the beginning of EMU the external current
account of the euro area has been close to balance.
The moderate imbalances that emerged from time to
time appeared anything but threatening. Yet, below
the surface, sizeable imbalances among EMU coun-
tries built up. A key driver of deficits was easy credit
that allowed some countries to fund private and pub-
lic saving-investment deficits. Thus, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Portugal and Spain, the so-called GIIPs coun-
tries that benefited from record low interest rates after * Deutsche Bank.the introduction of the euro, ran up a GDP weighted
deficit of about 7 percent of GDP at the height of the
credit bubble (Figure 1). Germany, on the other hand,
which did not benefit from a drop in interest rates
embarked on a policy of cost cutting to regain inter-
national competitiveness that was lost during the
1990s. At the same time, it ran up a current account
surplus of up to 8 percent of GDP, roughly offsetting
the deficit of the GIIPS countries (which together
have a GDP similar to that of Germany).
Both private and public sector savings-investment
deficits contributed to the current account deficits in
the GIIPS countries. Figure 2 shows the cumulated net
borrowing of the private and public sector from
abroad. Private and public sector net borrowing in
principle add up to the current account balance,
although in practice some statistical differences remain.
The current account deficits of
Greece and Portugal were
induced by both public and pri-
vate sector net borrowing.
Against this, Spain’s deficit was
almost entirely the result of pri-
vate sector borrowing. Ireland
ran an external surplus thanks to
private sector net lending. Italy
ran a small current account
deficit due to government bor-
rowing that exceeded somewhat
private sector lending.
Before the financial crisis the
emergence of internal current
account imbalances was not
given much attention by many
observers and policy makers,
including those at the ECB. It
was expected that market forces
would operate to smoothly cor-
rect these imbalances. However,
many ob  servers overlooked that
insufficient financial and eco-
nomic integration across euro-
area countries prevented default
risk diversification across coun-
tries, and that large current
account deficits led to the accu-
mulation of idiosyncratic risk on
a country basis. To appreciate
this point, consider first the case
where only big banks operate in
the whole of the euro area. The
big banks would manage credit risk across the euro
area, and they would aim at eliminating country-spe-
cific, idiosyncratic risk through credit portfolio diver-
sification. Moreover, these banks would not be sub-
ject to country-specific funding risks. Hence, a coun-
try-specific negative funding or credit shock would
not lead to systemic risk. Consider now the case where
banks operate only on a national basis. Borrowing in
the common currency in any one EMU member
country then creates roll-over risk. Foreign creditors
can afford to refuse to roll maturing debt when they
fear default as there is no need for them to reinvest
redemptions in the country where they receive them.
This is in stark contrast to the case of a country with
its debt denominated in its own currency: redemp-
tions there have to be reinvested eventually in the
same country, although not necessarily by the same
investor or into the same asset class. A ‘sudden stop’
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of funding of external deficits
is therefore virtually impossi-
ble (although the currency can
crash when investors attempt
to sell it in a rush).
Eurosystem funding of 
government debt
In the previous section we dis-
cussed the failure to pay prop-
er attention to the emergence
of large current account
imbalances in EMU and com-
pared the roll-over risk for for-
eign debt in EMU countries to
the risk of ‘sudden stops’ identified for emerging mar-
ket economies in the past. In this and the following
section we explore the role of the Eurosystem in tem-
porarily reducing the risk of a ‘sudden stop’ by filling
the funding gap created by investors’ refusal to roll
outstanding debt. Let us first consider the case of
government finances.
During most of the first ten years of EMU interest
rate convergence was the dominant theme for
investors in euro-area sovereign debt. With the risk
of sovereign default seen as negligible, investors pre-
ferred the initially higher yielding debt of EMU
countries with weaker government finances, until
yield differentials had almost disappeared. When
risk aversion suddenly surged during the financial
crisis, investors began to shun the debt of euro-area
countries with weak and dubious government
finances. At least initially and in part, funding of
weak governments was taken over by the
Eurosystem. Government bonds were sold to nation-
al banks, which funded these purchases by borrow-
ing money from the Eurosystem, with the same
bonds used as collateral for the loans. As a result,
government bond holdings of commercial banks
rose substantially as interest from other inves-
tors diminished (see Figure 3). In addition, the
Eurosystem started to buy bonds of governments in
financial difficulties directly in the secondary market
in May 2010 when private sector funding dried up
for a number of EMU countries (Figure 4). In
September 2011, the ECB extended its securities
markets programme to include also the purchase of
Italian and Spanish government bonds.
The Eurosystem’s involvement in the funding of gov-
ernment deficits can be defended
on two grounds: First, markets
may have reacted irrationally,
denying solvent governments the
roll of their outstanding debt
and hence triggering a liquidity
crisis. Second, with no other
body available for crisis manage-
ment, the Eurosystem had no
other choice than to step in and
to provide emergency liquidity
support. Of course, the longer
the Eurosystem’s involvement in
the funding of government
deficits lasts, the more difficult
becomes its defence and the
more obvious become the struc-
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Figure 4Survival of the currency union in the long-term will
depend to a significant extent on whether it will be pos-
sible to restore the two key principles of EMU: (1) the
focus of the Eurosystem on price stability alone, which
requires the end of its involvement in propping up gov-
ernments and banks in financial difficulties; and (2) the
full responsibility of national governments for their
finances, which requires default as the ultimate sanc-
tion for failure to live up to this responsibility.
Eurosystem funding of current account imbalances
In the previous section we discussed the role of the
Eurosystem in funding public sector financial imbal-
ances. In this section we turn to its role in funding
aggregate external current account imbalances. We
first discuss the accounting mechanics of intra-EMU
cross-border payments and then turn to recent devel-
opments within the Eurosystem’s interbank payment
system – Target2 (see also Sinn 2011; Sinn and
Wollmershäuser 2011).
The accounting mechanics of intra-EMU cross bor-
der payments can be best illustrated with an example.
Assume that a Greek customer buys a good from a
German supplier costing 5,000 euros. To finance the
purchase he takes out a credit from his bank over the
same amount. He now advises his bank to transfer the
5,000 euros to the bank of the German supplier. The
Greek bank debits the customer’s account and
requests the Bank of Greece, where it has an account,
to transfer 5,000 euros to via the ECB and the
Bundesbank to the bank account of the German sup-
plier. Following the transfer, the Bank of Greece 
has a liability of 5,000 euros towards the ECB (see
Tables 1 and 2). The ECB passes the funds on to the
Bundesbank for further transfer to the bank of the
supplier, where they go on his account (it is as if the
Bank of Greece had borrowed from the Bundesbank
via the ECB to fund the purchase by the Greek cus-
tomer). Now assume that the German bank of the
supplier lends the 5,000 euros back to a Greek bank.
In this case, the payment flows among the central
banks reverse and their balances with the ECB equili-
brate (Table 3). The German bank ends up with a
5,000 euros claim on the Greek bank, which has the
same claim on its customer. Assume, alternatively,
that the German bank refuses to re-cycle the funds to
Greece. In this case, the German bank holds on to the
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Table 1 
Initial balance sheets of national central banks and commercial banks (in euros) 
Bank of Greece  Bundesbank 
Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities 
5,000  
Loans to Greek bank 
5,000  
Greek bank deposits 
5,000 
Loans to German bank 
5,000  
German bank deposits 
0  
Claims on Eurosystem 
0  
Due to Eurosystem 
0  
Claims on Eurosystem 
0  
Due to Eurosystem 
Greek bank  German bank 










Central bank liquidity 
5,000  
Due to Bank of Greece 
5,000  
Central bank liquidity 
5,000  
Due to Bundesbank 
Source: Deutsche Bank. 
Table 2 
Balance sheets after Greek customer pays 5,000 euros to German supplier (in euros) 
Bank of Greece  Bundesbank 
Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities 
10,000  
Loans to Greek bank 
5,000  
Greek bank deposits 
5,000  
Loans to German bank 
10,000  
German bank deposits 
0  
Claims on Eurosystem 
5,000  
Due to Eurosystem 
5,000  
Claims on Eurosystem 
0  
Due to Eurosystem 
Greek bank  German bank 










Central bank liquidity 
10,000  
Due to Bank of Greece 
10,000  
Central bank liquidity 
5,000  
Due to Bundesbank 
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money (and perhaps reduces its demand for funds
from the Bundesbank) and the balances of the two
central banks with the ECB don’t equilibrate. Note
that in latter case the stock of central bank liquidity
has increased in the accounts of the German bank
(exceeding its liabilities against the Bundesbank). At
some point, the German bank may decide no longer
to keep this liquidity on account at the Bundesbank
and to purchase financial assets or extend credit in its
home market. Thus, the funding of current account
imbalances via the Eurosystem can fuel asset and/or
consumer price inflation in the surplus country.
Figure 5 shows the evolution of the Target balances
from the Bundesbank’s point of view. Until 2008 the
Bundesbank’s net claims against the ECB were close
to zero, indicating that private sector capital flows
financed the current account imbalances within
EMU. Since then, however, the Bundesbank’s net
claims have risen sharply as private sector flows dried
up due to rising risk aversion in the interbank money
market. When Germany’s surplus savings were no
longer re-cycled by the private sector, the Eurosystem
took over. The corollary to this development has been
the increasing reliance of banks in the peripheral
countries on the Eurosystem for the funding of their
assets. Figure 6 shows the total refinancing operations
of the ECB and the share of the five peripheral coun-
tries, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. In
2007, the five countries absorbed about 17 percent of
the funds provided by the ECB under repurchase
agreements, broadly in line with the size of their
banking sectors relative to the euro area. When an
increasing number of banks in these countries were
cut off from the market, their share in the ECB’s refi-
nancing operations rose to around 75 percent.
In our example above we explained the emergence of
imbalances within the Eurosystem as a result of trade
flows that were not funded by private sector capital
flows. However, imbalances can also emerge as a
result of capital movements alone. Suppose a Greek
saver decides to move his deposits
to Germany. This operation leads
to a debt in the Eurosystem
account of the central bank of
Greece and a surplus in the
account of the Bundesbank. Vice
versa sales of Greek government
bonds to foreign investors – e.g.
by a Greek bank to a German
insurance company – reduce the
liability of the Greek bank and
the claim of Bundesbank. 
Figure 7 compares changes in the
Bundesbank’s net position vis-à-
vis the Eurosystem with develop-
ments of Germany’s current
Table 3 
Balance sheets after German bank lends 5,000 euros to Greek bank (in euros) 
Bank of Greece  Bundesbank 
Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities 
5,000  
Loans to Greek bank 
5,000  
Greek bank deposits 
5,000  
Loans to German bank 
5,000  
German bank deposits 
0  
Claims on Eurosystem 
0  
Due to Eurosystem 
0  
Claims on Eurosystem 
0  
Due to Eurosystem 
Greek bank  German bank 










Central bank liquidity 
5,000  
Due to Bank of Greece 
5,000  
Central bank liquidity 
5,000  
Due to Bundesbank 
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Figure 5account. The fact that the Bundesbank’s net claims
against the Eurosystem rose faster than Germany’s
current account surplus suggests that there were also
capital movements into Germany. In addition to
money inflows from the export of goods and services,
the rise in Target2 balances reflects capital inflows
into Germany from other EMU countries as well as
the repatriation of German investment abroad.
Table 4 shows net claims and liabilities of Eurosystem
central banks against the ECB for the end of last year
and the latest available observation. Apart from
Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and Finland are
major creditors while Ireland, Greece and Portugal are
the major debtors. The debt of these countries is quite
large when compared to the size of their economies.
Target2 positions have further increased in the course
of 2011. The most significant deterioration occurred
in Italy, where a small net surplus
of 3.4 billion euros turned into a
large net liability of 103.5billion
euros. With the Italian current
account balance vis-à-vis the euro
area having changed only little
during the first half of 2011, the
recent deterioration hints at a ris-
ing deficit in the capital account.
Following the discovery of these
imbalances, a lively debate
emerged in Germany on how to
interpret them. Some private sec-
tor economists suggested that the
Bundesbank’s net claim on the
Eurosystem would add to Ger-
many’s exposure to troubled
euro-area countries, while offi-
cials have downplayed these
imbalances as purely technical.
However, Garber (1998 and 2010)
makes the much more important
point that the Eurosystem’s inter-
bank payment scheme can be
used to accommodate capital
flight out of one or more EMU
member countries into Ger-
many (and other EMU member
countries considered to be safe
havens). Such a flight could occur
if there were fears that a country’s
banking system could become
insolvent.
Garber (2010) warns: “if the fiscal authorities in the
EU were tough and pushed for restructuring [of gov-
ernment debt], then the flight would likely proceed to
the point where a substantial part of the national bal-
ance sheet is intermediated by the ECB. If the ECB
were to cease accepting the country’s paper as collat-
eral to end the haemorrhage, the outgoing payments
could no longer be made and the country’s banking
system de facto would be cut off from the euro. If the
country’s authorities kept the banking system open
for internal payments at least, the bank deposits in the
country would float against the euro currency”. In
other words, the euro would break up.
In the longer-term, a mechanism would seem to be
needed that prevents the unlimited rise of imbalances
within the Eurosystem. In the United States, imbal-
ances among the district Federal Reserve Banks aris-
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ing from inter-district payments (through Fedwire,
the US pendant to Target2) are settled annually (with
district Federal Reserve Banks paying in gold certifi-
cates). This ensures that regional central banks exert
pressure on commercial banks to fund their inter-
regional balances (or eliminate them if they can’t
fund them). The need for annual settlement within
the Eurosystem would imply that national central
banks would exert pressure on the commercial banks
in their countries to look for private external funding
of their assets or adjust the asset to the funds avail-
able from the market. A settlement could take place
through the transfer of gold reserves and shares of
private companies, which belong
to the government. As shown by
Figure 8 such a transfer would
considerably reduce the accumu-
lated deficits vis-à-vis the ECB in
certain cases.
Moreover, a higher degree of
financial integration would be
needed to establish a firmer base
for the common currency. Fi-
nancial regulation and supervi-
sion, deposit insurance and a bank
resolution scheme would need to
be established at a euro area level.
Banks would have to be encour-
aged to operate on a euro-area-
wide basis so that country specific
credit and funding risk could be
diversified across the euro area.
What should be done?
As it became more difficult to fund internal and exter-
nal imbalances in a number of EMU member coun-
tries, the Eurosystem stepped in and partly filled the
gap. This has exposed the Eurosystem to the risk of
sovereign and bank defaults and perhaps stiffened the
opposition of ECB members against any sovereign
debt restructuring, even when there are very serious
doubts about the solvency of a country. In our opin-
ion it would be too shortsighted to transfer a contin-
uing financing of insolvent states and their banks
from the Eurosystem to the public sector (as seems to
be in the minds of some ECB members). This would
let the opposition to EMU grow in the paying coun-
tries and could finally lead to a
partition or separation of EMU.
It is necessary, therefore, to cor-
rect the balance of payment
deficits by reducing the deficits in
the current account and the pri-
vate capital account.
A correction of the balance of
payments deficits can only be
expected, however, if domestic
goods, services and assets would
become markedly cheaper relative
to their foreign substitutes. A
drop in asset prices should neces-
sitate considerable write-downs of
Table 4 














Germany 325.6  449.6  Sept 18%  +  124.0 
Luxembourg 67.9  72.4  Aug  163%  +  4.5 
Netherlands 40.5 64.8  Sept  11%  +  24.3 
Finland 19.7  43.4  Sept  23%  +  23.7 
Italy  3.4  – 103.5  Sept  – 7%  – 106.9 
Malta  – 1.2  – 0.5  Aug  – 8%  + 0.7 
Slovenia  – 2.1  – 2.4  Aug  – 6%  – 0.3 
Cyprus  – 6.4  – 7.9  Sept  – 43%  – 1.5 
Slovakia –  13.3   
Belgium  – 13.9  – 24.1  Sept  – 6%  – 10.2 
ECB –  21.2   
Austria  – 27.5  – 35.5  June  – 12%  – 8.0 
France  – 28.3  – 33.5  Aug  – 2%  – 5.2 
Spain  – 50.9  – 82.8  Sept  – 8%  – 31.9 
Portugal  – 59.9  – 59.4  Aug  – 35%  + 0.5 
Greece  – 87.1  – 97.5  Aug  – 44%  – 10.4 
Ireland  – 145.2  – 140.6  Aug  – 0.9  + 4.6 











Sources: International Financial Statistics; OECD.
Gold reserves and company shares of GIIPS countries in public ownership
Figure 8the granted credits based on these assets. Credits to the
state would also have to be written down correspond-
ingly, as they with markedly reduced tax revenues in a
nominally shrunken economy could no longer be
served completely. To date, such an adjustment process
in the private and public sectors are barely visible. But
adjustment is urgent. For the willingness of the ‘sur-
plus’ countries to finance deficits in the Eurosystem via
their national central banks is likely to end when large
parts of the population of the ‘deficit’ countries start
to withdraw their money from the local banks and
transfer it to the safe surplus countries. This would be
a clear sign of the people of the deficit countries with-
drawing from the liability for questionable bank cred-
its to the private sector and the government and trying
to shift possible losses via the Eurosystem to the com-
munality of taxpayers in the euro area. If, however, the
surplus countries refuse to accept the flight capital
from the deficit countries, then the euro will have lost
its function as common currency.
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